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Abstract: The secret of Being and Time and of its constant cultural and philosophical presence lies in 
its unusual hermeneutical richness. Being and Time becomes, so to speak, a precise seismometer 
capable of detecting the slips and falls of the contemporary era with surprising accuracy. It offers us 
an exact scan of the ethical and moral conscience of our time. Being and Time does not develop a 
philosophical theory among others, rather it faces the challenge of thoroughly reflecting upon the 
dilemma that is constantly present in philosophy, namely the question of human being and its relation 
to being in general. From this point of view, I would like to consider the possibility of reading this 
fundamental work of Heidegger as an ethics of existence, that is, as book that promotes a cultivation 
of the self. 
Key words: authenticity, care, constancy, falling prey, self.  
 
Resumen: El secreto de Ser y tiempo y de su constante presencia cultural y filosófica descansa en su 
particular riqueza hermenéutica.  Ser y tiempo es un sismógrafo capaz de detectar con una asombrosa 
precisión los corrimientos y las fallas de la era contemporánea, ofreciéndonos a la par una radiografía 
exacta de nuestra situación moral y ética. Este libro no desarrolla una teoría filosófica más, sino que 
se embarca en la aventura de pensar a fondo el problema central de la filosofía, a saber, la cuestión de 
la existencia humana y de su relación con el ser. Desde este punto de vista se plantea la posibilidad 
de leer la obra magna de Heidegger en términos de una ética del cuidado, es decir, como obra que 
promueve un cultivo de sí. 
Palabras clave: autenticidad, cuidado, constancia, caída, sí mismo. 
 
 
Being and Time and the spirit of its era 
 
Still today, Being and Time remains a magical work, a title composed of two 
intriguing words that, in its complex simplicity, attempts to reconsider the 
fundamental question in the history of philosophy: the question of being. The 
                                                          
1 This study has been funded by the Spanish Department of Science and Education (Project reference: 
FFI2009-13187) and the Fellowship for Advanced Researchers of the Humboldt Foundation 
(Germany). 
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secret of Being and Time and of its constant cultural and philosophical presence 
lies in its unusual law. Being and Time does not develop a philosophical theory 
among others, but rather it faces the challenge of thoroughly reflecting upon the 
dilemma that is present in traditional philosophy. How does Heidegger face this 
challenge? Mainly by reexamining the fundamental problem that has pervaded 
Western thought: the problem of being. However, he does this in a peculiar way, 
by bringing together the basic concerns of the contemporary time period: the 
disillusionment of the modern world, the conflict of traditional values, the 
decline of metaphysics, the fleeing of the gods, the realms of technology, the 
hegemony of instrumental rationality and the search for new symbolic resources 
for mankind. In this sense, Being and Time becomes a precise seismometer 
capable of detecting with surprising accuracy the slips and falls of the 
contemporary era, offering us an exact scan of the ethical and moral conscience 
of our time. Hence its enduring relevancy, even well into the 21st century. From 
this point of view, I would like to consider the possibility of reading Being and 
Time as aesthetics of existence, that is, a book that promotes a cultivation of the 
self. 
Being and Time has the ability, as Susan Sontag comments regarding 
photography, of sloughing off the flakes that obscure our everyday vision, and, 
in so doing, of creating a new way of viewing reality.2 In a strong and passionate 
tone, solicitous and at the same time distant, attentive to detail but without losing 
sight of the main focus, Being and Time allows us to grasp the social world just 
as it is, including its misfortunes. Philosophy can be benign, but it is also an 
expert in cruelty when it comes to portraying the symptoms of a society that is 
sick, idle and decadent. A harsh diagnosis of reality that, in his own way, 
Nietzsche had already put forward in his Untimely Meditations which depicted 
German cultural society as a time period dominated by professors and 
technocrats, and by military and government officials. From this point of view, 
Being and Time has its full share in the climate of intellectual unrest, of 
existential inhospitality and of spiritual uneasiness of an era dominated by the 
decadence of heroes.  One finds multiple portrayals of a fragmented society and 
of a lack of idols in works of the time period such as Robert Musil’s The Man 
Without Qualities, Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain, James Joyce’s Ulysses, 
Franz Kafka’s The Metamorphosis, and, in a very visual way, Edvard Munch’s 
The Scream, and in Robert Wiene’s film The Cabinet of Doctor Caligari.3   
                                                          
2  SONTAG, Susan: Sobre la fotografía, Edhasa, Barcelona, 1981, pp. 109ss. 
3 More details about the intellectual atmosphere in which this productive stage in Heidegger’s life 
took place can be found in: NOLTE, Ernst: Heidegger. Política e historia en su vida y pensamiento, 
Tecnos, Madrid, 1998, pp. 67-102; OTT, Hugo: Martin Heidegger. En camino de su biografía, 
Alianza, Madrid, 1992, pp. 117-132; SAFRANSKI, Rüdiger: Un maestro de Alemania. Heidegger y 
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Therefore, it is hardly surprising that from this bleak landscape of German 
society there spontaneously emerge questions that are in some way or another 
related to the sense of human existence. What is there to do with a civilization 
that is drifting without direction? How can one escape a technical rationality that 
calculates all the variables of human existence, that eliminates all trace of human 
individuality and that subjects personal will to the causal order of science? The 
spirit feels trapped and distrusts a positivist discourse that aims to construct an 
ideal society and to rationally govern the course of history. Life needs to make a 
way for itself and to break away from false conceptions of the world. One must 
look back upon reality and face the complex question of how to recapture the 
immediacy of life experience. This means we must launch an enormous effort 
towards destruction and creation of a new philosophical language that overcomes 
the conceptual constraints of science and metaphysics. Heidegger accepts the 
concepts of philosophy as an attack on every type of certainty and trust in the 
world. Sometimes one cannot ignore in the young Heidegger the voice of the 
“lawbreaker self” of the protagonist of Dostoyevsky’s novel, Notes from 
Underground, which calls back to an independent and autonomous self. That 
underground self, like the pretheoretical life which Heidegger speaks of in his 
first lecture courses at Freiburg, rejects the Euclidian world of positive 
rationalism that seeks to resolve the complexity of human problems with the 
precise procedures of logic and arithmetic. It is simply a matter of preserving the 
uniqueness of each individual without resigning oneself to being another face in 
the crowd. In short, one must constantly practice a hermeneutic of suspicion in 
order to return to the individual the capacity of thought and action.  
Therefore, we need men with charisma who are capable of updating the old 
structures of thought and behaviour. Philosophy should respond to the 
fundamental questions of human existence, even though this may mean going 
against the established order. Living philosophically is equivalent to living 
precariously and thinking against preconceived norms. The young Heidegger 
becomes an echo of this call, already taking on the challenge of developing a 
new idea of philosophy in his first lectures of 1919. We find ourselves, as 
                                                                                                                                   
su tiempo, Tusquets, Barcelona, 1997, pp. 101-137. For the political, social, and economic context of 
the era, see: FERGUSSON, Alan: Cuando muere el dinero. El derrumbamiento de la República de 
Weimar, Alianza, Madrid, 1984; GAY, Peter: La cultura de Weimar, Argos, Barcelona, 1984; 
WATSON, Peter: Historia intelectual del siglo XX, Crítica, Barcelona, 2002. And specifically 
regarding the philosophical framework of the time period, consult: BAMBACH, Charles: Heidegger, 
Dilthey and the Crisis of Historicism, Cornell University Press,  London,1995, pp. 21-56; BARASH, 
Jeffrey: Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning. Martinus Nijhoff, Den Hague, 
1988, pp. 17-89; GADAMER, Hans-Georg: “Sobre la filosofía alemana en el siglo XX”, en ER. 
Revista de Filosofía, número 26, Sevilla, 2000, pp.189-217. 
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Heidegger comments with a certain tone of drama, at the crossroads that decides 
upon “the very life or death of philosophy. We stand at an abyss: either into the 
nothingness, or we somehow leap into another world.”4 We are at one of the 
most philosophically and personally decisive moments in Heidegger’s life. On 
the one hand, we observe his break with the system of Catholicism and his 
Protestant marriage to Elfredi Petri and, on the other hand, there are clear signs 
of estrangement with respect to his solid theological and Neo-Kantian training 
which points towards the development of a hermeneutics of factual life. In this 
sense, Karl Löwith shrewdly portrays the peculiar personality of the young 
Heidegger: “A Jesuit by education, he became a Protestant through indignation; 
a dogmatic through education; an existential pragmatist through experience; a 
theologian by tradition, and an atheist as researcher.”5 Different aspects of a 
person who attempts to grasp a phenomenon as mysterious, as slippery and as 
foggy as that of human existence in its utter facticity. Life presents itself to the 
young Heidegger as an enigma waiting to be understood. The decipherment of 
that enigma sets the course for an early philosophical itinerary that will 
gloriously culminate in his great book, Being and Time (1927).  
In this sense, this magnum opus can be read as a philosophical novel which, 
like other novels of the time period, reflects upon the significance of being 
human in an era dominated by science, highlighting the subjection of the 
individual to more powerful forces that crush him, belittle him, and manipulate 
him to the point that he loses sight of the sense of his own existence. In Being 
and Time we discover Dasein as a protagonist in a plot that is structured in three 
acts: in the first act, we find a Dasein that is comfortably installed in the 
certainties of daily life, that knows how to cope with the collectively recognized 
standards of behaviour in a practical and efficient manner, that shares a similar 
set of values and expectations with the surrounding people, that feels protected 
by the society to which it belongs; in the second act, this familiar world in which 
Dasein feels at home enters into sudden and unexpected crisis, causing the 
disorientation and bewilderment of a Dasein that, for the first time in its life, 
finds itself placed before the world and not able to respond, that has nothing to 
hold on to, that floats aimlessly in an unknown ocean, that hangs in an utter 
abyss, and that is held captive by anguish; and in the third act, this Dasein 
becomes aware of its unpredictable situation, bravely accepts its condition and 
decides to regain control of its existence, designing its own life model which 
struggles against the fatal inertia that causes it to fall captive back into the 
                                                          
4 HEIDEGGER, Martin: Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie (1919), Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt 
am Main, 1987, GA 56/57, p. 63. 
5 LÖWITH, Karl: Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933, Metzer, Stuttgart, 1986, p. 45. 
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anonymous grasp of everyday reality. Heidegger wants his readers to throw 
themselves into the great void, to hear the fundamental whisper of life, and 
combat the existential boredom of the era. 
Heidegger responds to this problem from a totally new perspective: an 
analysis of human life and its peculiar ability to face its inherent tendency to fall. 
The analysis of human existence that is carried out in Being and Time, and 
therefore in previous lectures, is really an analysis that turns against the tendency 
that life shows towards repeatedly falling prey to the clutches of public opinion 
with the aim of giving it successful form, as if life were a work of art to which 
Being and Time intends to impart a beautiful appearance. 
 
 
Being and Time as an ethics of the care? 
 
Heidegger, as we know, avoids the classical definition of man understood as a 
rational animal. Human existence basically consists of care (Sorge). This 
conception of human nature may perhaps surprise the reader of Being and Time, 
but it is not new by any means, but rather dates back to the ancient tradition of 
the care of the self and of the care of the soul. Heidegger himself admits having 
found the concept of “care” in the ancients and points out its importance for 
Greco-Roman philosophy and Christian spirituality. Thus, for example, 
regarding a comment on the last letter of Seneca, specifically epistle CXXIV, he 
writes: 
 
The perfectio of human being –becoming what one can be in being free for 
one’s ownmost possibilities (project)– is accomplishment of care6 
 
From this perspective, Being and Time can be read within the framework of a 
long tradition of the care of the self, initiated by Plato, practiced by the different 
Hellenistic schools, later forgotten by the philosophy of the scholastic era and, 
finally, taken back up by authors such as Michel de Montaigne, Blaise Pascal, 
Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche, which reaches its greatest 
contemporary expression in the ethics of care of Michel Foucault.7 
                                                          
6 HEIDEGGER, Martin: Sein und Zeit, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1986, p. 199.  
7 See, for example, the course of the Collège de France L’herméneutique du sujet (1982). For a 
systematic approach to the basic contribution of Hellenistic Schools and their presence in 
contemporary ethical discourse, see NUSSBAUM, Martha: The Therapy of Desire. Theory and 
Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, Princenton University Press, Princenton, NY, 1994. 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 4, 2013, pp. 13-28 
JESÚS ADRIÁN ESCUDERO 
 
18
Here is not the proper place to exhibit the concrete decisions and the flourishing 
stages of this tradition.8 It is sufficient to remember its central idea, simplified in 
Plato’s simple assertion that the human soul is in movement.9 In the majority of 
cases, mankind lives absorbed in its daily worries, victim to its desires and 
passions, chained to its professional ambitions and dependent upon economic 
and material factors. The movement of the soul, nevertheless, allows one to look 
back upon oneself, that is to say, it provokes a conversion of the gaze, and it 
makes an internal change possible. However, this self-cultivation is not 
motivated by narcissistic interests and aestheticizing criteria (a charge which, on 
the other hand, is frequently brought against Foucault). Focusing on the interior 
world does not exclude but, in fact, directly draws our attention to the evils of 
society. In this sense, self-escalation comes accompanied by a movement of the 
liberation of the ego’s always limited perspectives and demands. The young 
Heidegger was already very conscious of this potential confusion when he points 
out in his 1921 course about Augustine that 
 
The self-concern appears easy and convenient, interesting and superior as 
“egoism”. (…) Really: self-concern is precisely the most difficult, taking 
oneself to be less and less important by engaging oneself all the more; positing 
to oneself precisely an “objectivity” in the face of which that of the generality is 
mere playfulness, a convenient getting-done of the things themselves and of the 
beings and their connections.10  
 
The call for Dasein to take care of itself, to pay attention to its own being, even 
the later idea of letting itself experience a calming of the spirit like serenity 
(certainly, very close to Epicurean ataraxia), invites one to read Being and Time 
from the stimulating perspective of the care of the self. Does Heidegger’s 
suggested similarity between Dasein and the soul perhaps not authorize such a 
reading?11  
                                                          
8 Among other interesting works, one should take in consideration: HADOT, Pierre: Exercises 
spirituels et philosophie Antique, Agustiniennes, Paris, 1981; DOMANSKI, Juliusz : La philosophie, 
théorie o manière de vivre? Les controverses de l’Antiquité à la Renaissance, Éditions Universitaires, 
Éditons du Cerf, Fribourg and Paris, 1996; VOELKEE, André-Jean: La philosophie comme thérapìe 
de l’âme, París, 1993. 
9 Cf. PLATO: Laws, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1956, Book X, 896a. 
10 HEIDEGGER, Martin: Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens (1920/21), Vittoirio Klostermann, 
Frankfurt am Main, 1995, GA 60, p. 241. 
11 See, for example, HEIDEGGER, Martin: Sein und Zeit, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1986, p. 14; 
HEIDEGGER, Martin: Platon: Sophistes (1924/25), Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1992, 
GA 19, pp. 23, 57; HEIDEGGER, Martin: Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie (1926, Vittorio 
Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1993, GA 22, p. 107; Heidegger, Martin: Die Grundprobleme der 
Phänomenologie (1927), Vittoiro Klosterman, Frankfurt am Main, 1989, GA 24, pp. 155, 171, 318. 
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It is at first glance, then, that one can observe a considerable amount of 
relatedness between Being and Time and the ancient tradition of the care of the 
self (in both its Greek and Latin equivalents of epimeleia heauton and cura sui, 
respectively). In both cases, it is a question of opening up the possibility of a self 
that is more intense, more fundamental and appropriate, and one that realizes the 
human tendency to get lost in things, to get caught in the whirlwind of daily 
tasks, and to be influenced by public opinion. It is exactly this dual possibility of 
leading a life that is in between authenticity and inauthenticity, perdition and 
salvation, ignorance and wisdom that is a constituent part of the care’s 
fundamental ambivalence. Echoing another basic dimension of the tradition of 
the care of the self, Heidegger speaks of a “conversion,” of an “about-face,” of a 
“turning back” (Hinkehr) of Dasein from its starting position of fleeing (Abkehr) 
from itself to describe this possibility of care’s changing direction.12 As it is 
known, Heidegger insists upon the idea that Dasein regularly becomes distanced 
from itself. To use one of his preferred expressions, man is more frequently far 
away from himself (weg-sein) than he is there (da-sein). This is why he speaks of 
a “being alert,” of a “being awake” (Wachsein) to describe the secret (and, in the 
end, ethical) purpose of the analysis of human life that is programmatically 
developed for the first time in the well-known 1923 course Ontology. The 
Hermeneutics of facticity.13 Wegsein is a form, albeit deficient, of Dasein. It is 
                                                                                                                                   
See further LARIVEE, Alain and LEDUC, A.: ’’Le souci de soi dans “Ȇtre et temps”. L’accentuation 
radicale d’une tradition antique?, en Revue Philosophique de Louvain, número 100(4), 2002, pp.723-
741. 
On the other hand, Krämer points out that the concept of “care”, easily to be associated to the ancient 
moral paradigm, suffers an ontological transformation in Heidegger (cf. KRÄMER, Hans: Integrative 
Ethik, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1992, p. 192). Finally, one cannot forget Franco Volpi`s 
suggestive thesis that it is possible to read Being and Time as a treatise of practical philosophy (cf. 
VOLPI, Franco: „Dasein como praxis. L’assimilation et la radicalisation heideggeriene de la 
philosophie practique d’Aristotle’’ , en VOLPI, Franco et al. (eds) : Heidegger et l’idée de la 
phenomenology, Kluwer Academic Publisher, Dordrecht, 1998, pp. 1-44;  VOLPI, Franco: Being and 
Time: A Translation of the Nichomachean Ethics?”, en KISIEL Theodore and BUREN, John (eds.): 
Reading Heidegger from the Start. Essays in His Earliest Thought, State University of New York 
Press, Albany, 1994, pp. 195-212: VOLPI, Franco: VOLPI, Franco: “Ser y tiempo: ¿una versión 
modernizada de la Ética a Nicómaco»”, en ROCHA, Alfredo (ed.): Martin Heidegger. La 
experiencia del camino, Uninorte, Barranquilla, 2009, pp. 3-31. 
12 Cf. HEIDEGGER, Martin: Sein und Zeit, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1986, pp. 184-185. 
13 Cf. HEIDEGGER, Martin: Ontologíe. Hermeneutik der Faktizität (1923), Vittorio Klostermann, 
Frankfurt am Main, 1988, GA 63, p. 10. For more information about the phenomenon of Wegsein and 
the ethical dimension of the hermeneutics of facticity, see GRONDIN, Jean:  „Das junghegelianische 
und ethische Motiv in Heideggers Hermeneutik der Faktizität“, en Der Sinn für Hermeneutik, 
Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994, pp. 89-102 ; GRONDIN, 
Jean : ‘’L’herméneutique dans Sein und Zeit ‘’, en COURTINE, Jean-Francois (ed.), :Heidegger 
1919-1929. De l’herméneutique de la facticité à la métaphysique du Dasein, Paris, Jean Vrin, 1996, 
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this self-neglect, this estrangement that is attacked by Heidegger, who –as a good 
phenomenologist– wants, on the one hand, to stimulate the ability to be open to 
oneself and, therefore, to being, and, on the other hand, to fight the obstruction 
that idle talk (Gerede) exerts on this openness.  
In a similar way to the majority of ancient philosophers, Heidegger not only 
shows an occasional interest in the tendency of individuals to become estranged 
from themselves, but rather he interprets this movement as them truly fleeing 
from themselves. In this context, Heidegger uses the expression “plunge” 
(Absturz) and “eddying” (Wirbel) to respectively describe the “groundlessness 
and nothingness of inauthentic everdayness” and the “movement of falling 
prey”.14 Starting with Pascal’s harsh comments about fleeing from oneself, 
Heidegger traces back the root of this phenomenon to the movement of falling 
(Verfallen) in the world of things.15 This is a leitmotiv as much as in Heidegger’s 
early work as in Being and Time, which is conveyed in the well-known 
difference between authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) and inauthenticity 
(Uneigentlichkeit). Indeed, authenticity and inauthenticity denote nothing more 
than the two possible paths that Dasein can take in carrying out its existence: 
either flee from itself and from its more appropriate choices, or embrace these 
choices as a manifestation of responsibility in the form of a wanting-having-
conscience. In sum, the presence of the topic of self-knowledge, which 
Heidegger rechristens transparency16, places us before one of the most important 
tasks of epimileia heauon, of understanding the possibility of being-self as 
“constancy of the self” (Ständigkeit des Selbst).17  
 
                                                                                                                                   
pp. 188-189. 
14 HEIDEGGER, Martin: Sein und Zeit, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1986, p. 178. 
15 In the lectures of 1921/22 Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, Heidegger already had 
analyzed and described the consequences of this movement of falling prey (Verfallenstendenz) such  
as Ruinanz, Abstand, Abriegelung, Praestruktion, and Reluzenz (cf. HEIDEGGER, Martin: 
Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische 
Forschung (1921/22), Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1985, GA 61, pp. 100-106, 117-
123, 131-147). These modes of being can be related to the phenomenon of temptation (Versuchung) 
analyzed in the context of a deeper discussion of he phenomena  dispersio and tentatio described by 
Augustine in Book X of Confessions (cf.  HEIDEGGER, Martin: Phänomenologie des religiösen 
Lebens (1920/21), Vittorio Klostermann,  Frankfurt del Main 1995, GA 60, pp. 210-238). 
16  Cf. HEIDEGGER, Martin: Sein und Zeit, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1986, p. 146. In Being and 
Time, Heidegger consciously avoids the concept of “self-knowledge” or “self-acquaintance” 
(Selbsterkenntnis). He prefers to speak of transparency (Durschsichtigkeit) in order to avoid any kind 
of solipsism.  
17 As Greisch has noticed, this evokes the stoic echo of care of the self (GREISCH, Jean: Ontologie et 
temporalité. Esquisse d’une interprétation intégrale de Sein und Zeit, Paris, PUF, 2003, p. 310). 
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The constancy of the self in the double sense of constancy and steadfastness is 
the authentic counter-possibility to the lack of constancy (Unselbst-ständigkeit) 
or irresolute falling prey. Existentially, the constancy of the self (Selbst-
ständigkeit) means nothing other than anticipatory resoluteness.18 
 
Obviously, there are more than a few critics who reject this approach to reading 
Being and Time, even Heidegger’s text itself offers a certain amount of 
resistance. The first and clearest objection is that Heidegger, in contrast to the 
ancient thinkers, does not analyze life’s concrete characteristics, he does not 
establish anything prescriptive, does not formulate anything imperative. His 
analysis is purely formal. One cannot forget that “in the existential analytic we 
cannot, on principle, discuss what Da-sein factically resolves upon”.19 
Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that the ancient authors who defended a 
epimileia heauton are not noted for subjecting themselves to a series of 
prescriptive behaviors through which their self-care becomes universally 
defined. Rather than prescribe universal rules of behavior, they offer instructions 
on how to lead, carry out, and complete a full life. The tradition of the care of the 
soul returns the individual to his/her particular situation; it awakens the feeling of 
responsibility toward oneself. In short, the practices of self refer to a choice of 
life, that is to say, they do not present themselves as an obligatory category that 
is imposed universally, but rather, in Heideggerian terms, they possess an 
indicative-formal character that establishes Dasein’s way’s of being. When it 
comes down to it, can it not be said that “universal phenomenological ontology, 
which taking its departure from the hermeneutics of Da-sein”20, tries to establish 
the conditions of possibility of authentic life? It is true that the ontological 
analysis of Being and Time is not guided by a particular ideal of life, that is, it 
does not offer “a definite ontic interpretation of authentic existence”.21 However, 
paradoxically, is Being and Time not the incarnation of a concrete task such as 
the questioning of being and the establishment of its conditions of what is 
possible?  
Therefore, we could say that Dasein is still an undetermined entity, always 
open to new and changing possibilities, which, on the one hand, tends to lose 
itself, but, on the other hand, holds the possibility of recovering from its 
dispersion. In this sense, philosophy is transformed into an efficient instrument 
for the self-realization of human life. Philosophy not only builds enormous 
                                                          
18 HEIDEGGER, Martin: Sein und Zeit, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1986, p. 382 (italics in the 
original). 
19 Ibid, p. 382. 
20 Ibid, p. 38. 
21 Ibid, p. 301. 
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theoretical frameworks and emphasizes the aspect of knowledge, but also 
contributes a set of teachings about life in the form of a knowledgeable 
knowledge that encourages a life transformation: the transition from ignorance to 
wisdom, from sin to salvation, from opinion to truth, from impropriety to 
propriety. In this case, philosophy goes hand in hand with a way of life, that is to 
say, with a practical understanding of human reality which implies a certain vital 
knowledge and a certain amount of caring for oneself. Philosophical insight not 
only provides a pure theoretical knowledge, but also fulfils a consoling, guiding, 
and advisory function. Hence philosophy might also be considered therapeutic, 
an antidote to a decadent culture such as that of the Germans, brilliantly depicted 
by Nietzsche, Spengler, Weber, Mann and Heidegger among others. In all their 
depictions we find the program of Humanitätsbildung (human educational 
training) which, with distinct emphases and from different perspectives, supports 
an aesthetic, literary and philosophical instruction for mankind. Genuine 
philosophizing makes it possible to give existence a life-like form, in the same 
way that an artist imparts a beautiful form to his work of art. This search for a 
comprehensive human training is magnificently reflected in the maxim that 
Nietzsche uses as a subtitle to his autobiography Ecce homo: Become what you 
are! (Werde, der Du bist!). This maxim, which traces back to Pindar22, is a very 
common feature in Greco-Roman culture. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the 
Hellenistic schools also universalized this Pindaric maxim, which not only 
applies to the athlete and the soldier, to the merchant and the navigator, to the 
politician and the landowner, but rather to any person whose life can be 
interpreted in agonistic terms, that is to say, like agon, as a constant struggle to 
achieve a successful life in accordance with the nature that is characteristic of all 
individuals. Man’s self-realization consists of daring himself to follow his own 
nature. The stoics, for example, utilize the theory of oikesis, the tendency that all 
individuals show to remain in their house (oikós) and if not in their house, the 
tendency to return to it. In the end, the task of being yourself is equivalent to a 
life choice, to a way of accomplishment that involves fulfilling a full existence 
within the framework of a natural habit to fall captive to excess, to indulgence, to 
social habits, to daily routine and rumors. Really it comes down to struggling 
with oneself. And, without a doubt, out of all the possible victories, the most 
glorious is that which is achieved over oneself. 
The solution that Heidegger will later refer to in Being and Time registers, 
ultimately, in the sphere of the practical question about the meaning that we want 
to give to our existence, which finds itself always destined to shift between one 
of two possibilities: now an improper existence now a proper existence. Here 
                                                          
22 Cf. PINDAR, Pythian, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962,  II, 73. 
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again it is highlighted that the practical question obligates one to confront 
oneself. Evading freedom is as significant as fleeing from oneself. The available 
time to make a choice which is opened by the practical question has the nature of 
a “self-choosing” which offers the possibility of a self-determination of our 
being, free from prescribed norms; an assessment that is in accordance with the 
phenomenon of differentiation that Dasein undergoes because of the anxiety that 
“reveals to it authenticity and inauthenticity as possibilities of its being”.23 
Therefore, there exists a scope of decision in which one considers how to carry 
out one’s existence.   
The same structuring of the work in two large sections aims to conceptually 
express the existential hiatus in which contemporary man lives: the first section 
develops a complex hermeneutics of everyday life that analyzes the different 
forms of estrangement and fleeing from oneself, while the second section 
proposes a hermeneutics of responsibility through which the individual becomes 
critical of his real state of disorientation. In both cases, Heidegger advances a 
genuine hermeneutics of the self. Just like what happens with Hellenistic 
philosophies and with late Foucault that develop a hermeneutics of the practices 
of the self that is parallel to biblical hermeneutics, Heidegger first offers a 
complete diagnosis of the evils of the time period in order to later recommend an 
appropriate remedy. It is a matter of carrying out self-reflection in order to get to 
know yourself regarding your own limits, your relationships with others, your 
contact with the world and, in conclusion, your choices in designing your own 
life according to freely and independently chosen criteria. Life, in short, is 
subjected to a constant test. There is no situation that always returns unchanged, 
that is, every life situation must be weighed calmly and analyzed for itself in 
order to offer an answer that is appropriate to the circumstances of the moment. 
This is undoubtedly the ideal of the sensible and wise man depicted by Aristotle. 
And this explains, in part, the fascination that the young Heidegger experienced 
from reading Nicomachean Ethics, to which he dedicated a commendable 
exegetic effort (as is shown by his substantial and brilliant interpretations of the 
sixth book in the course of his first lectures of the winter semester of 1924/25).24 
The tests to which we are daily subjected are not a part of our determined period 
of instruction, but rather they integrate with a general attitude toward life, they 
turn into a lifestyle, so to speak. A lifestyle that corresponds very well to the 
                                                          
23 HEIDEGGER, Martin: Sein und Zeit, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1986, p. 191. 
24 See, for example, Heidegger’s splendid lectures on Plato’s Sophistes (HEIDEGGER, Martin: 
Plato: Sophistes (1924/25), Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1992, GA 19, pp. 21-187, as 
well as the famous Natorp Bericht from 1922, and the interesting pages of his course from 1924 on 
Aristotle’s rhetoric (HEIDEGGER, Martin: Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie (1924), 
Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 2002, GA 18, pp. 113-160, 191-207). 
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classic metaphor of sailing, which contributes a series of factors that affect the 
control and steering of an existence that endlessly floats on an ocean of desire 
and temptation. Life never stops being a journey, that is, a genuine movement 
from one point to another. This movement, in turn, implies having a clear idea of 
the port of arrival and, therefore, requires a set of knowledge and skills 
associated with steering that can be easily obtained for the destination of our own 
existence. This model of steering –very similar to the control of illness by 
medicine, to the military skills of the warrior and to the political government of a 
city– is intimately linked to the activity of governing oneself. From this point of 
view, one can enjoy reading Being and Time as an invitation to embark on an 
internal journey, a journey that always has features of an odyssey that is plagued 
with obstacles and danger, some known and others unknown, which we must 
successfully overcome in order to steer our life to a safe harbor. 
 
 
What about the other? The possibilty of the ethical encounter of the other in 
friendship 
 
Heidegger’s relation to the ethical is a difficult and controversial matter. It is 
known that the philosopher has never dedicated any special work to that topic, 
and this very absence is many times understood as the symptom of a deep ethical 
failure at the heart of his ontological thinking. Many critics affirm that the 
excessively solipsistic character of the existential analytic developed in Being 
and Time blocked Heidegger’s path to understand the primarily intersubjective 
character of everyday human interactions in the common world.25 The 
assumption that Dasein’s existence lacks any ultimate moral or rational ground 
does not imply its un-ethical character. Of course, such a post-metaphysical 
ethics should not be framed as a systematic undertaking. 
 I think that these critical assessments suffer from an insufficient analysis 
of Heidegger’s notion of the self. His ethics of the care is not a kind of 
individualistic journey of self-discovering still tainted by Husserlian solipsism. It 
is journey that cannot ignore the other. Being and Time insists in the idea that we 
are also responsible to recognize the other’s potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, 
without reducing its possibilities to our own or those of they-self.26 But 
following Heidegger’s analysis of the public sphere the other does normally not 
                                                          
25 Among others, see HABERMAS, Jürgen: Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, 1995, pp. 145ff; WOLIN, Richard: The Politics of Being: The political Thought of 
Martin Heidegger, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, pp. 65, 149.150. 
26 Cf. HEIDEGGER, Martin: Sein und Zeit, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1986, p. 264. 
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show itself. How can we let it be itself? In a way, Heidegger suggests the moral 
obligation of letting speak the other, letting it interpret itself, allowing it to 
discover its own possibilities. The other can only truly be allowed to speak if we 
allow ourselves to hear.  However, as a part belonging to the publicity, the other 
–like any Dasein or entity– is primordially exposed to the normativity of the 
‘they’ (Man).    
 The other can only be incorporated into the ‘they,’ qua itself, by a change 
in the ‘they.’ The existential determination of decadency is not contradictory to 
the possibility of a modification in Dasein’s behavior that discloses the 
possibility of authentically being one’s own self. In order for the other to be 
received in our world, we must make space for its otherness. One might view it 
in terms of the reception of a guest in one’s home. We make room for our guest. 
We give her our guest its own space. But simultaneously one’s own dwelling 
place must be altered to accommodate the guest. Part of one’s home is 
‘destroyed’ by emptying a place for the potential reception of persons external to 
one’s home. Even more, if the other is someone with whom we will dwell, then 
the entire home must be made compatible with the other’s possibilities and 
concerns. 
 It is important to stress that Heidegger is concerned with the other and 
with question of otherness as such. Dasein’s selfhood (Selbstheit) and singularity 
(Vereinzelung) does not imply irresponsibility toward others in the common 
world, does not cut off its worldly relation with others, since there is a 
fundamental difference between a singularized and a solipsistic self. The resolute 
Dasein opens up the possibility of letting the other be itself, thus ensuring the 
possibility of an ethical encounter of itself and of the other in a particular mode 
of being that we shall call genuine friendship. Heidegger emphasizes that 
“resoluteness does not detach Dasein, as authentically being itself, from its 
world, it does not isolate it in a free-floating I”.27 In other words, resoluteness 
also “modifies, in an equally originary way, the discovery of the ‘world’, as well 
as the openness of the co-existence of others”.28  This means that Dsein is not 
fully oblivious of the other. Resolute Dasein is not only concerned about itself 
but is also solicitous to the other with whom it coexists in the world. The ethical 
traces of Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein become more evident in the rich and 
complex of resoluteness (Erschlossenheit), where Dasein is “impelled into a 
solicitous being-with with others. (…) It is only in resoluteness to one’s own self 
that Dasein is brought into the possibility of letting the co-existing others ‘be’ in 
                                                          
27 Ibid, p. 298. 
28 Ibid, p. 297. 
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their ownmost possibility of being”.29 
 How do we access to the other? How does the other come to 
manifestation? First and foremost in the mode of being of hearing. Hearing 
constitutes Dasein’s most authentic openness to its ownmost possibility of being, 
as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries by itself. By 
hearing the voice of the other, which is deeply rooted in its own self, Dasein 
becomes open to the being of others in the peculiar modality of solicitude 
(Fürsorge). This allows the establishment of an authentic bond in which the 
other is liberated to its own freedom. 30 The possibility of the ethical encounter 
of the other as irreducible otherness is the positive counterpart of the mode of 
being solicitous to the other. In authentically hearing the voice of the friend that 
each Dasein carries by itself, Dasein does not merely listen to the impersonal 
voice of the public ‘they’ but also becomes opened to the recognition of the 
otherness as such. Ontically speaking, as Duarte points out, “it means that Dasein 
has become genuinely friends with the other”, 31without leveling the other to the 
dominating values of the public sphere. Resolute Dasein has, thus, acquired the 
possibility of an authentic, responsible and respectful encounter with the other. 
In an ontological sense, friendship is the possibility of caring for the other 
respecting its own space of freedom and self-determination. A further analysis of 
friendship and the constitution of the self should allow us to trace a path in Being 
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